Operation All Clear

For others things named All Clear, see All Clear (disambiguation).
Operation All Clear
Part of Insurgency in Northeast India

A part of the 108 chörten built on the Dochu-La pass, to commemorate the operation
Date15 December 2003 – 3 January 2004
LocationSouthern Bhutan
  • Samtse District
  • Samdrup Jongkhar District
  • Sarpang District
  • Zhemgang District
Result

Bhutan victory

  • Destruction of rebel encampments.
  • Expulsion of the remaining rebels.
Belligerents

Bhutan Royal Bhutan Army
Bhutan Bhutanese Militia[1]


Supported by:

India India
ULFA
NDFB
KLO
NSCN
ATTF
BLTF[2][3]
Commanders and leaders
Bhutan Jigme Singye Wangchuck
Bhutan Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck
Bhutan Lam Dorji
Bhutan Batoo Tshering
India Nirmal Chander Vij
[4][5]
Arabinda Rajkhowa
Bhimkanta Buragohain  (POW)
Mithinga Daimary  (POW)
Ranjan Daimary
Milton Burman  (POW)
Tom Adhikary  (POW)
Harshabardhan Barman  (POW)[4][6][7]
Strength
6000 RBA
634 Bhutanese Militia[1][6]
1500–3500 [6]
Casualties and losses
11–34  
35–60  (WIA)[8]
160  
490  (POW)[6]

Operation All Clear was a military operation conducted by Royal Bhutan Army forces against Assam separatist insurgent groups in the southern regions of Bhutan between 15 December 2003 and 3 January 2004. It was the first operation ever conducted by the Royal Bhutan Army.

Background

In 1990 India launched Operations Rhino and Bajrang against Assamese separatist groups. Facing continuous pressure, Assamese militants relocated their camps to Bhutan.[6]

In the 1990s, United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) allegedly assisted the government of Bhutan in the expulsion of the ethnic Lhotshampa population, occupying the land left behind by the refugees.[5][9]

In 1996 the Bhutan government became aware of a large number of camps on its southern border with India. The camps were set up by four Assamese separatist movements: the ULFA, NDFB, Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) and Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO). The camps also harbored separatists belonging to the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF).[4]

The camps had been established with the goal of training cadres and storing equipment, while the thick jungles of the region also enabled the militants to easily launch attacks into Indian territory.[10]

India then exerted diplomatic pressure on Bhutan, offering support in removing the rebel organisations from its soil. The government of Bhutan initially pursued a peaceful solution, opening dialogue with the militant groups on 1998. Five rounds of talks were held with ULFA, three rounds with NDFB, with KLO ignoring all invitations sent by the government. In June 2001 ULFA agreed to close down four of its camps; however, the Bhutanese government soon realized that the camps had simply been relocated.[6]

KLO had also been allegedly involved in establishing links between Nepalese Maoists and Bhutan Tiger Force, a Bhutanese militant organization. This strengthened the Bhutanese government's resolve to launch the operation.[9]

On 19 July 2003, a group of Bhutanese parliamentarians proposed to raise the number of Bhutanese militia, by introducing a Swiss-style militia training for all citizens aged between 18 and 50. The motion was dismissed by foreign minister Jigme Thinley and Brigadier General Batoo Tshering, who asserted that 5,000 Royal Bhutan Army soldiers have been deployed to the country's border with India.[11]

On 3 August 2003, more than 15 gunmen attacked a ULFA base in Kinzo, leaving two ULFA members dead. The attackers fled after the rebels returned fire.[12] The following day, a group of between 10 and 12 gunmen attacked ULFA members residing in an abandoned house in Babang. Four gunmen and one ULFA fighter perished in the encounter.[12] In response, a ULFA spokeswoman blamed the attacks on mercenaries and SULFA fighters hired by the Indian government. Indian officials attributed the attacks to rebel infighting.[12]

During the course of 2003, Bhutan reestablished its militia force.[1] By 15 September 2003, the Bhutanese militia consisted of 634 volunteers. The militia volunteers were deployed in the southern regions of the country, after undergoing a two-month training period. Bhutan's militia played a supporting role during the conflict.[1]

By 2003 the talks had failed to produce any significant result. On 14 July 2003, military intervention was approved by the National Assembly.[6] On 13 December 2003, the Bhutanese government issued a two-day ultimatum to the rebels. On 15 December 2003, after the ultimatum had expired, Operation All Clear – the first operation ever conducted by the Royal Bhutan Army – was launched.[13]

Operation

A map of Bhutan.

Aftermath

In a follow-up action to the operation, 22 Bhutanese civilians were found guilty of aiding the separatists with charges ranging from supplying the militants with food to providing services in exchange for money. Another 123 Bhutanese citizens were facing trial on similar charges as of July 2004.[18]

Between 2008 and 2011, Royal Bhutan Police and Royal Bhutan Army personnel undertook numerous actions against unidentified militants. Several firefights occurred while Bhutan military personnel were required to dispose of several explosive devices and destroyed a number of guerrilla camps.[19] The incidents that took place during the period include:

Footnotes

  1. 1 2 3 4 "Bhutan's Militia". Kuensel. 15 September 2003. Retrieved 4 October 2014.
  2. "Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) - Former Terrorist Group of Assam". SATP. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
  3. "Bhutan Backgrounder". SATP. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 Anand Kumar (25 December 2003). "Operation All Clear: Bhutan's step for regional security". Kathmandu Post. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
  5. 1 2 Anand Swaroop Verma (April 2004). "The military Offensive against ULFA". Revolutionary Democracy. Retrieved 11 September 2014.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dipankar Banerjee (January 2004). "Implications for insurgency and security cooperation" (PDF). IPCS. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
  7. 1 2 3 4 "Bhutan attack was betrayal, says Ulfa leader". Telegraph India. 22 July 2004. Retrieved 15 December 2010.
  8. 1 2 "A Nation Pays Tribute". Kuensel. 15 August 2004. Archived from the original on June 10, 2011. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
  9. 1 2 Praveen Kumar (July 2004). "Assessing Bhutan's Operation All Clear". IDSA. Retrieved 11 September 2014.
  10. 1 2 Teresa Rehman (27 January 2007). "Seek Revenge!". Tehelka. Retrieved 11 September 2014.
  11. Tashi Dema (16 June 2007). "Militia Should Start in 2008". Kuensel. Archived from the original on June 10, 2011. Retrieved 17 October 2014.
  12. 1 2 3 Subir Bhaumik (4 August 2003). "Gunmen kill India rebels in Bhutan". BBC. Retrieved 28 September 2014.
  13. Arun Bhattacharjee (19 December 2003). "Bhutan army sees action at last". Asia Times. Retrieved 17 October 2014.
  14. 1 2 "124 killed in Bhutan operation". Tribune India. 17 December 2003. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
  15. "Protecting mutual concerns and interests". Kuensel. 27 December 2003. Archived from the original on June 10, 2011. Retrieved 17 October 2014.
  16. "The Bodo & Ulfa Problem". Kuensel. 3 January 2004. Retrieved 28 September 2014.
  17. "RBA Makes Good Progress in Flushing Out Operations". Kuensel. 3 January 2004. Retrieved 26 October 2014.
  18. G. Vinayak (22 July 2004). "Bhutan books 22 abettors of Indian militants". Rediff News. Retrieved 11 September 2014.
  19. 1 2 Tshering Tobgay (16 December 2011). "Thanking our armed forces". Retrieved 4 October 2014.
  20. "NDFB attacks". Times of India. 20 February 2011. Retrieved 12 September 2014.
  21. "BTN/BHUTAN/SOUTH ASIA". Wikileaks. 13 August 2010. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
  22. "Four police injured in NDFB ambush in Sarpang". Bhutan News Service. 21 February 2011. Retrieved 12 September 2014.
  23. "NDFB appeals Bhutan to disclose whereabouts of outfit's missing leaders". Assam Sentinel. 21 February 2011. Retrieved 12 September 2014.
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